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IPv6 protocol, which should replace the actual IPv4 protocol, brings many new possibilities and improvements
considering simplicity, routing speed, quality of service, and security. In comparison to IPv4, IPv6 improves
mechanisms for assuring a secure and confidential transfer of information. DNS has been extended to provide
security services (Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)) mainly through public key cryptography.
We propose a new approach to DNSSEC that may result in a significantly more efficient protocol. We introduce
a new strategy to build chains of trust from root servers to authoritative servers. The techniques we employ are
based on symmetric-key cryptography. With the depletion of IPv4 address and rampant information security
threat, IPv6 and DNSSEC are widely deployed in recent years, but there is no platform that can integrate all
relevant detection information and technical information and provide advice for officers concerned in Taiwan.
This paper implements an Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and DNSSEC and presents the results of preliminary
testing and statistics which can help technology and promoting staff to do evaluation, promotion, and debugging
on IPv6 and DNSSEC deployment easily.
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1 Introduction
The Internet protocol (IP) address is the necessary net-
work protocols for each individual computer to access the
Internet. Before 2013, almost all computers are connected
to the Internet via Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) ad-
dresses, but unfortunately, with the growth of the Internet
population, the use of IPv4 addresses has become less and
less. In other words, IP is facing the problem of depletion.
Actually, IPv4 address exhaustion has been anticipated
since the late 1980s, and as unexpectedly, the top-level
exhaustion occurred on January 31, 2011 [1–3] and the
RIR (Regional Internet Registries) and the APNIC’s (Asia-
Pacific Network Information Centre) exhaustion on April
15, 2011, and some parts of the world have already
exhausted their IPv4 allocations [4–6], and the remaining
RIRs are expected to deplete their pools within a few years
[5]. To deal with the long-anticipated problem of IPv4
address exhaustion, Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) in 1996 that started with RFC 1883.
Table 1 shows the population of the world over the
years with regular Internet penetration. Whether we can
find in Asia, Europe, or elsewhere, Internet use is in-
creasing. In Asia, the Internet population between 2000
and 2012 had increased by 841.9 %. Additionally, the
latest data of Internet population is 167,335,676 which
accounts for less than one fifth of the total population
in Africa. It is worth noting that during these years,
Africa has grown 3606.7 % (Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the Internet population in Taiwan be-
tween December 2006 and December 2012. Even though
the growth of Internet population has slowed down, but for
IT-big countries, like Taiwan, it has high speed and stable
network environment which are necessary things (Fig. 1).
Internet population increased rapidly in all regions,
but IP which can be directly connected to the Internet is
limited. Thus, it is particularly important to promote
IPv6. On June 8, 2011, top websites and Internet service
providers around the world, including Google, Facebook,
Yahoo!, Akamai, and Limelight Networks joined together
with more than 1000 other participating websites in
World IPv6 Day for a successful global-scale trial of the
new Internet Protocol, IPv6 [7]. On June 6, 2012, the
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Internet Society carried out a World IPv6 Launch day to
bring permanent IPv6 deployment for the products and
services of the participants [8]. Following the success of
the 2011 test day and 2012 launch day, there are more
and more government agencies and business organiza-
tions to complete the deployment of IPv6.
IPv6 and Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) are the next generation of Internet infrastruc-
ture. For a more stable and secure network environment,
countries around the world are actively promoting the
deployment. In view of this, this paper proposes and im-
plements an Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and
DNSSEC to help technology and the promoting staff to
do evaluation, promotion, and debugging on IPv6 and
DNSSEC deployment easily in Taiwan.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First,
some knowledge and existing tools are introduced in
Section 2. Second, the design of Auxiliary Deployment
System and its expected results are described in Section 3.
Then the implementing process of our system and its
demo are given in Section 4. Finally, our conclusion is
drawn in Section 5.
2 Background
2.1 IPv6
IPv6 is the latest version of IP, and it is also called Internet
Protocol next generation (IPng). IPv6 is intended to re-
place IPv4 which was developed by the IETF to solve the
increasingly serious problem of IPv4 address exhaustion.
In Section 2, we introduce the deployment status of
Taiwan and around the world.
2.1.1 Status of IPv6 deployment
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is a nonprofit organization that coordinates
the Internet’s global domain name system. The Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is a department of
ICANN responsible for managing the Domain Name
System (DNS) Root and the numbering system for IP
addresses. In February 2011, ICANN assigns IPv4 ad-
dresses of the last five groups to five RIRs, including the
following: African Network Information Center (AFRI-
NIC), American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN),
Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), Latin
America and Caribbean Network Information Centre
Table 1 World Internet usage and population statistics














Africa 1,073,380,925 4,514,400 167,335,676 15.6 3,606.7 7.0
Asia 3,922,066,987 114,304,000 1,076,681,059 27.5 841.9 44.8
Europe 820,918,446 105,096,093 518,512,109 63.2 393.4 21.5
Middle East 223,608,203 3,284,800 90,000,455 40.2 2,639.9 3.7
North America 348,280,154 108,096,800 273,785,413 78.6 153.3 11.4
Latin America/Caribbean 593,688,638 18,068,919 254,915,745 42.9 1,310.8 10.6
Oceania/Australia 35,903,569 7,620,480 24,287,919 67.6 218.7 1.0
World total 7,017,846,922 360,985,492 2,405,518,376 34.3 566.4 100.0
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Fig. 1 Taiwan Internet usage and population statistics
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(LACNIC), and Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordi-
nation Centre (RIPE NCC). At the same time, ICANN de-
clared that the IPv4 address has been exhausted. Figure 2
presents the status of IPv4 allocation over the years.
Figure 2 shows the status of IPv6-enabled users world-
wide as measured by Google. We can see that the number
of people using IPv6 significantly increased in recent years.
2.2 DNSSEC
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
has been proposed to deal with the lack of data integrity
and validation of data sources by IETF. In Section 2.2.1,
how DNSSEC works is introduced, and related research
on DNSSEC is summarized in Section 2.2.2. At last,
Section 2.2.3 describes the deployment status of Taiwan
and around the world.
2.2.1 What is DNSSEC?
DNSSEC is an improved version of DNS-based protocol.
DNS’ original design did not consider the security issues;
the main purpose is to provide convenience for network
users to convert domain names to IP addresses. Figure 3
shows the DNS query process.
Due to IP addresses (especially in IPv6) not easily re-
membered, the DNS has been developed. But DNS
provides only the basic mapping services for domain
names and IP addresses; hackers can easily tamper
with the DNS data or cause the DNS server not to
work properly.
According to the research of the past few years, the
following problems of DNS were discovered:
Buffer overflow attack is a network attack for DNS
software vulnerabilities, not protocol, such as ISC BIND
and Windows DNS Server, sometimes also called “flood-
ing attack.” Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) are common network attacks;
it does not cause data corruption, but users could not
properly use the services. Figure 4 shows the architec-
ture of a DDoS attack.
Below we will introduce to the working principle of
DNSSEC. While DNSSEC will increase the burden on
the server that leads to amplify the effect of these at-
tacks, DNSSEC can avoid its server, becoming an attack
tool for hackers. The term “pharming” is a neologism
based on the words “farming” and “phishing.” Some-
times also called “cache poisoning,” it causes the name
server to return an incorrect IP address, diverting traffic
to another computer (often the attacker’s). Figure 5
shows the architecture of a pharming attack.
DNSSEC does not modify the existing mode of oper-
ation of DNS, scilicet, DNSSEC does not change the exist-
ing DNS query and response processing, but through an
extension of the method to achieve the security of DNS.
On the basis of the traditional DNS, IETF added some
resource records and two header flags into DNS. Below
we will explain the newly added records [7–11]:
 DNSKEY
DNSSEC public key, defined in RFC 4034.
DNSSEC resource records contain the public key for
the zone. They come in two flavors, a zone signing
key (ZSK) and a key signing key (KSK). Generally,
Fig. 2 IPv6-enabled users. Source: https://www.vyncke.org/ipv6status/
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the KSK signs only certain records within the zone,
while the ZSK signs all of the records. You may
have as many of each as required for key-rollover
protocols or for your needs.
 DS
Delegation signer, defined in RFC 4034.
A DS resource records stored key tag, algorithm
number, and DNSKEY RR’s digest, used in the
DNSKEY certification process. DS resource records
and its corresponding DNSKEY resource records
have the same owner name, but they are stored in
different places. DS resource records appear only in
the parent zone, such as “example.com.” DS
resource records are then stored in the “com” zone,
and its corresponding DNSKEY resource records
are to be stored in the “example.com” zone.
 DLV
DNSSEC look-aside validation, defined in RFC 4431.
The DLV resource record has exactly the same wire
and presentation formats as the DS resource record.
DLV record does not inherit any of the special
processing or handling requirements of the DS record
type. Unlike the DS record, the DLV record may not
appear on the parent’s side of a zone cut. A DLV
record may, however, appear at the apex of a zone.
For example, a DS record has your zone’s name
(example.com) while a DLV record has an
additional name (example.com.dlv.isc.org.).
 NSEC
Next secure, defined in RFC 4034.
NSEC resource records links to the next record
name in the zone and lists the record types that
exist for the record’s name. These records can be
used by resolvers to verify the non-existence of a
record name and type as part of DNSSEC validation.
 NSEC3
Next secure ver.3, defined in RFC 5155.
Like NSEC, NSEC3 resource records can also be
used by resolvers to verify the non-existence of a
record name and type as part of DNSSEC validation.
Attacker
Zombie Zombie Zombie Zombie ZombieZombie
Victim
User User User User UserUser
SYN Packets
Fig. 4 Architecture of a DDoS attack
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The NSEC3 resource record links to the next record
name in the zone and lists the record types that exist
for the name covered by the hash value in the first
label of the NSEC3 resource records’ own name.
NSEC3 resource records have the same functionality
as NSEC, except NSEC3 resource records use
cryptographically hashed record names to prevent
enumeration of the record names in a zone.
 RRSIG
Resource record signature, defined in RFC 4034.
RRSIG holds the digital signature of DNSSEC;
resolvers can use public key in DNSKEY resource
records to verify it.
DNSSEC works by the use of cryptographic digital
signatures which are included in secured zones as re-
source records. When the client receives a response mes-
sage, they can determine whether the response message is
secured by DNSKEY which is authenticated via a chain of
trust. Figure 6 shows the DNSSEC query process.
Simply, DNSSEC is fully compatible with the traditional
DNS. And DNSSEC is a set of extensions to DNS which
through the mechanism of digital signatures provides
the following security guarantees, but not availability or
confidentiality.
For data integrity, each DNS zone using DNSSEC re-
quires a pair of keys, namely, “public key and private
key,” which are generated by the DNS administrator; the
private key is kept secret by the administrator, and the
public key is published in the zone file used to define
DNSKEY resource records. When the data has been
modified, the chain of trust would be broken. Through
the layers of verification from the end node to the root
zone, we believe that the DNS data are correct. Because
root zone was managed by hand, it should not be easily
hacked theoretically. DNSSEC allows a resolver to valid-
ate that a certain domain name does not exist. When
returning a negative DNSSEC response, the DNS server
usually includes up to two NSEC records or three
NSEC3 records. With these record and hashed data of
the DNS record, we can know whether it is true that a
URL does not exist.
2.2.2 Related research
DNSSEC in the future is an important network infra-
structure. In addition to IETF, in many countries some
scholars have conducted research and discussion on this.
On May 3 2007, Mark Santcroos and Olaf M. Kolk-
man published the “DNS Threat Analysis”; they men-
tioned that although it has the above advantages,
DNSSEC does not solve any of the problems that have
to do with transport; in fact, since packets are bigger,
they consume more resources in the servers and on the
wire and impose rules on firewalls. That may provide
new vectors for (D)DOS attacks [12]. Moreover, the key
management system is also more complex.
In 2005, Wei-An Chen published “The Easy Security
Protection and Validation System for DNS Server using
DNSSEC” [13], and Shiau-Han Jang published “The Study
of Apply DNSSEC to building a Protection Mechanism
DNS Server
Client
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Fig. 5 Architecture of a pharming attack
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for DNS Pharming” [14] in 2007. Both discuss and im-
plement DNSSEC system applications.
In 2010, Mantoro, T.; Norhanipah, S.A.; and Bidin,
A.F., published “An implementation on Domain Name
System security extensions framework for the support of
IPv6 environment” [15]. In 2011, papers relating to
“against local DNSSEC attacks” [16], “update scheme”
[17], “OpenID service” [18], and “mobile peers in HIP
networks” [19] have been published in succession. Lin
Tao, Liu Wu, Duan Haixin, and Sun Donghong also pub-
lished “IPv6 Traffic Hijack Test System and Defense
Tools Using DNSSEC” [20].
In 2013, Migault, D.; Senecal, S.; Francfort, S.; Herbert, E.;
and Laurent, M., proposed “PREFETCHing to Overcome
DNSSEC Performance Issue on Large Resolving Platform”
to improve DNSSEC performance issues [21].
These studies mentioned above make us more
confident that DNSSEC will improve our future network
environment, so we should actively promote DNSSEC
implementation. Actually, several ISPs have started to
deploy DNSSEC-validating DNS recursive resolvers. On
May 6, 2013, Google Public DNS has enabled the
DNSSEC validation by default.
2.2.3 Status of DNSSEC deployment
In order to solve the traditional DNS problems in se-
curity, since 2009, many countries have embarked on
the top domain DNSSEC-related experiments, and after
more than 1 year of experimental test, in 2011, official
succession of import operations of DNSSEC appeared.
According to a survey commissioned by TWNIC
commissioned research team in 2013, 13 servers in the
root domain have fully supported DNSSEC. In the
generic TLDs, i.e., “.com,” “.net,” and “.org,” there are
nine domains that support DNSSEC. In country code
top-level domains (ccTLDs), there are 87 domains that
support DNSSEC, and 4 domains can partially support
DNSSEC that accounted for 34.39 % of all 253 still in
use in the domain. Table 2 lists the DNSSEC deploy-
ment status of TLDs.
Figure 7 shows the DNSSEC deployment status around
the world. Figure 8 shows the penetration of DNSSEC on
all continents.
2.3 Existing detection platform
Next, we will introduce current testing tools for IPv6
and DNSSEC. For IPv6, there are many tools used to
detect IPv6.
Since 2001, CHT-TL IPv6 Testing Lab has provided a
test service which was named “IPv6 Ready Logo Program”
at present.
While the IPv6 Ready Logo Program provides the
detailed examination above, it is not free, and neither
is the immediate service. More importantly, the IPv6
Table 2 DNSSEC deployment status of TLDs
Domain Total Number of support Percent
Root domains 12 13 100
gTLDs 26 9 35
ccTLDs 253 87 34.39
Fig. 7 DNSSEC deployment status. Source: dnssec-deployment.org
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Ready Logo Program does not provide the function of
statistics and records.
Hexillion also proposed the “CentralOps.net” which is
a collection of Internet utilities to test IP and DNS infor-
mation. Table 3 lists the functions which were provided
by CentralOps.net.
CentralOps.net is free for everybody. It does not
require login; simply pick a tool on the menu and use it.
In addition to these real-time services, CentralOps.net
also provides paid services on extended or automated
use of its tools. CentralOps.net provides a variety of
testing services that has the advantage of instant and
free, but also does not provide the functionality of sta-
tistics and records.
For DNSSEC, VeriSign launched DNSSEC Debugger
which is a web-based tool for ensuring that the “chain
of trust” is intact for a particular DNSSEC-enabled do-
main name since 2011; they provide detailed informa-
tion for DNSSEC in plain text with a few icons.
DNSSEC Debugger has the advantage of instant and
free, but it does not provide the functionality of statis-
tics and records. Figure 9 shows the analytical results of




To promote IPv6 and DNSSEC in Taiwan, we designed
the Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and DNSSEC.
Below we will discuss the target objects of the system
services.
IPv6 and DNSSEC are the network infrastructure in
the future. Because the benefits of IPv6 and DNSSEC for
an average user are relatively non-sense, we expect the
government to play the role of a leader. In fact, as men-
tioned in Section 2, the deployment system which
TWNIC launched for IPv6 is also designed for each local
government. Academic network has been used by many
people, including teachers, students, and staff. And each
school usually has a variety of server services, such as
DNS service, email servers, web servers, FTP servers.
Therefore, we believe it is necessary to be promoted on
educational institutions. In this paper, educational insti-
tutions are classified to state schools and private schools.
We can take to explore the future development of both.
To supervise operation of organizations, property, pur-
pose, etc., the nature of the foundation is between the
government and the general business, so in addition to








Fig. 8 Penetration of DNSSEC on all continents
Table 3 The functions on CentralOps.net
Function name Caption
Domain Dossier Investigate domains and IP addresses. Get registrant information, DNS records, and more—all in one report.
Domain Check See if a domain is available for registration.
Email Dossier Validate and troubleshoot email addresses.
Browser Mirror See what your browser reveals about you.
Ping See if a host is reachable.
Traceroute Trace the network path from this server to another.
NsLookup Look up various domain resource records with this version of the classic NsLookup utility.
AutoWhois Get Whois records automatically for domains worldwide.
TcpQuery Grab a web page, look up a domain, and more.
AnalyzePath Do a simple, graphical traceroute.
Source: http://centralops.net/co/
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the upgrade status of the foundation. Web browsing is a
network service that is most commonly used by general
users, so we refer to the websites which was Alexa
Internet-listed to sort out top 100 traffic websites in
Taiwan as our observed object. Table 4 lists the top 10
websites in Taiwan which were listed by Alexa Internet
in 2014.
Although this system is primarily used to investigate
and test the deployment status of domestic units, we still
have to detect and record for upgraded status of
ccTLDs. In addition, we also collect national develop-
ment IPv6 and DNSSEC-related information via the
Internet.
3.2 Target objects
A project manager is the leader who is responsible for
IPv6 or DNSSEC deployment. Project managers can
view all the information and modify all the services and
personnel data. In ADS, a project manager is termed
“admin,” a leader of technology or promoting staff in
IPv6 or DNSSEC deployment in each area. A district
manager can only work through the log information and
detection to counseling members in their areas of re-
sponsibility. In ADS, a district manager is termed “man-
ager,” any person. In addition to the observed objects
that were mentioned in the previous section, we also let
general users detect objects what they want to do. Users
can even choose to perform a complete inspection or
testing in general, which can help them to more easily
obtain the desired information.
Fig. 9 DNSSEC Debugger by VeriSign. Source: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com
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3.3 Research framework
To allow all users use the Auxiliary Deployment System
for IPv6 and DNSSEC at any time and any place, we de-
signed it as a web-based testing platform. Figure 10 lists
our tools for system implementation.
Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and DNSSEC is
divided into a front-end and a back-end. The front-end of
our system provides many real-time information about
IPv6 and DNSSEC and helps guest to debug and detect
addresses of their services. Figure 11 shows the schematic
diagram of the detection in ADS. Users can perform a
complete detection or general detection on demand.
The back-end of our system only allows admin and
manger login. A manager is responsible for counseling
members to deploy IPv6 and DNSSEC; managers can
view statistical information automatically by the system
in order to understand what they are responsible for the
progress of their work area. Figure 12 shows the deploy-
ment status of government services.
In addition to this, mangers can also participate in our
survey to let us understand their use situation to im-
prove our system and help in the decision-making, but
managers could not modify a member’s service data.
Managers can only work through the log information
ADS
Front-end Back-end
Information Detect Management Analyzer
Detector
Crawler
Statistics Report Service Survey
Fig. 10 System framework
Fig. 11 Schematic diagram of the detection in ADS
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and detection to counseling a member to upgrade their
service to ensure the correctness of this work. Only an
admin can modify the service. The admin is the man-
ager’s superiors; the admin can manage all members and
their services. Figure 13 shows the functional architec-
ture of the back-end of our system.
Detection and statistics are the most important fea-
tures of this system. Users can use this feature to detect
their service to obtain the status of IPv6 and DNSSEC
deployment and its environment. When the user wants
to view the statistical results, the system will automatic-
ally generate plain text and graphical information for
users. If the user chooses graphical information, then the
user can clearly see the upgrade status of each region.
3.4 Methods
We use the built-in Linux commands “dig,” “ping,”
“nslookup,” and others to detect the target address;
through the analysis of the target resource records, we
can know its deployment status of IPv6 and DNSSEC.
For example, if a website has an AAAA resource record
and the system could get a header through sending an
IPv6 request like a general browser, then the system will
determine that the website can support IPv6 connection.
We observe the target object and record their resource
record. Then we can analyze these data to estimate the
status of deployment of the target objects. Finally, we
will refer the results to the relevant personnel. Figure 14
shows the research process of this paper.
In order to satisfy the system requirements, such as
system functions and low cost, Auxiliary Deployment
System for IPv6 and DNSSEC use the open-source plat-
form and tools for implementation. Table 5 lists our tools
for system implementation.
In terms of implementations, first, we will sort out all
observed objects to list, then implement a web-based
Fig. 12 Deployment status of government services
Admin
DebuggingModification Member Detection Statistics
Manager
DebuggingSurvey Information Detection Statistics
Fig. 13 Functional architecture of the back-end of our system
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platform. The platform provides promoters to promote
IPv6 and DNSSEC easily. Promoters can see the in-
formation, including deployment progress of a local
government, educational institutions, foundation of
government, and some famous website. These infor-
mation were derived from the system automatically
detected. Promoters can understand the progress of
their area of responsibility development from these
information and as debugging and decision.
4 Experimental result
4.1 DNSSEC deployment status of ccTLDs
DNSSEC is a new network security agreement. In order
to understand the current status of deployment of the
world, this paper also investigated the deployment status
of the domestic situation and the deployment of ccTLDs.
Figure 15 shows the DNSSEC deployment status of
ccTLDs on all continents.
Here, this paper will discuss the situation for DNSSEC
deployment of the major regions.
1. Asia-Pacific region
This area will hold regular DNSSEC workshops and
let domain management unit of countries share
experiences and exchange technology. And there is
the not-for-profit regional Internet registry for the
Asia-Pacific region names APNIC (Asia-Pacific
Network Information Centre) which provides
number resource allocation and registration services
that support the global operation of the Internet.
Including Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan,
East Asia has a more complete DNSSEC
development than the others in the Asia-Pacific
region. These countries have more IT industry
and better economic development.
On the other hand, many countries in the Southern
Asia have not yet begun to deploy DNSSEC because
some countries have no funds or resources that can
provide construction.
2. Europe
In Europe, the organization responsible for
allocating IP addresses is RIPE NCC (Réseaux IP
Européens Network Coordination Centre) whose
headquarters are in Amsterdam and protected by
law in the Netherlands. RIPE NCC is in more than
70 countries worldwide including Russia, the Middle
East, and parts of Central Asia; any organizations or
individuals can become a member of RIPE NCC.
Because the Internet infrastructure in Europe’s
earlier development and national income per capita
is higher than others, most countries in this region
have completed the deployment of DNSSEC. The
countries that have not yet deployed DNSSEC are
more concentrated in southern Europe and the
Middle East. The reason should be social instability.
3. Americas
Only a few countries with large economies of scale
in Americas have completed the deployment of
DNSSEC. Several countries of the Caribbean and
Latin America have not yet deployed DNSSEC.
There are two organizations responsible for
allocating network resources. One is ARIN
(American Registry for Internet Numbers), which
is responsible for North America and parts of
the Caribbean, and the other is LACNIC (Latin
American and Caribbean Internet Address Registry)
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Fig. 14 Research process
Table 5 Our tools for system implementation
Tool name Caption
CentOS 7 Linux-based operating system
Python 3.4.2 Used to collect and analyze data
PHP 5.4.16 Used to implement the website of our system
MariaDB 5.5.40 Used to record data
HTML5+CSS3+Javascript Used to design the user interface
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which is responsible for Latin America and parts
of the Caribbean.
4. Africa
In Africa, the agency responsible for distribution of
network resources is AFRINIC (African Network
Information Center).
Because development is lagging behind, only a
few large countries have promoted DNSSEC
development in Africa.
5 Conclusions
IPv6 and DNSSEC deployment issues in recent years
have been enthusiastically discussed and implemented.
Both IPv6 and DNSSEC are indispensable role next-
generation systems. For this reason, we introduced
related knowledge in the first place and, lastly, pro-
posed an Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and
DNSSEC to help our government to more easily pro-
mote deployment.
To make the deployment of IPv6 and DNSSEC easier,
we designed a web-based system which named Auxiliary
Deployment System for IPv6 and DNSSEC for pro-
moters and any person who want to use these. This sys-
tem is divided into a front-end and a back-end. At the
front-end, users can see some information about IPv6
and DNSSEC including news, reports, and various statis-
tics. In addition, users can also detect any domain name
to determine whether it supports IPv6 or DNSSEC via
complete detection or general detection that the users
choose. At the back-end, an admin can manage any ser-
vices of each organization and carry out some investiga-
tion to improve system integrity and understand the
needs of users. In addition to interaction with the users,
the system also detects a task for service list every hour
that is established by our crawler module.
The Auxiliary Deployment System for IPv6 and
DNSSEC greatly reduces the complexity of deployment
tasks which has many advantages, including a friendly
interface, real-time information, integration, security,
and free. In the future, we will actively use the system in
IPv6 and DNSSEC deployment. Besides the practical ap-
plication of our system, we will also do data mining of
detected records for the associated research.
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